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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF UTAH
THE STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff/Appellee,

Case No. 920328-CA
Priority No. 2

MARK S. BLAHA,
Defendant/Appellant.

JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT
Jurisdiction is conferred on this Court pursuant to Utah
Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(f) (1992 Repl. Vol.).

STATUTES, RULES AND CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS
See Addendum A for text of relevant statutes, rules and
constitutional provisions.

STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW
1.

Did the search warrant affidavit establish probable

cause to search the duplex as required by the fourth amendment?
Standard of Review.

This Court reviews the affidavit "in a

common sense manner and as a whole [citation omitted]" to determine
whether the magistrate had "a substantial basis for concluding that
probable cause existed."

State v. Weaver, 817 P.2d 830, 833 (Utah

App. 1991); State v. Rowe. 806 P.2d 730, 732 (Utah App. 1991),
overruled on other grounds. Case No. 910165 (Utah September 28,
1992) . It "need not defer to the trial court's finding" and instead

makes "an independent review of the trial court's determination of
the sufficiency of the written evidence."

Weaver, 817 P.2d at 833.

Both this Court and the Utah Supreme Court have stated that
the appellate court must give deference to a magistrate's
determination that an affidavit established probable cause.

Weaver.

817 P.2d at 833; State v. Romero, 660 P.2d 715, 719 (Utah 1983).
Deference to the magistrate, however, is not
boundless . . . [R]eviewing courts will not defer
to a warrant based on an affidavit that does not
"provide the magistrate with a substantial basis
for determining the existence of probable
cause." "Sufficient information must be
presented to the magistrate to allow that
official to determine probable cause; his action
cannot be a mere ratification of the bare
conclusions of others."
Even if the warrant application was
supported by more than a "bare bones" affidavit,
a reviewing court may properly conclude that,
notwithstanding the deference that magistrates
deserve, the warrant was invalid because the
magistrate's probable cause determination
reflected an improper analysis of the totality of
the circumstances, or because the form of the
warrant was improper in some respect.
United States v. Leon. 468 U.S. 897, 914-5 (1984) (citations
omitted); accord State v. Droneburcr, 781 P.2d at 1305.

Hence, the

magistrate cannot act merely as a rubber stamp for police officers
seeking warrants.

Leon, 468 U.S. at 914.

The deference given a magistrate's determination has been
questioned by at least one member of this Court.
P.2d at 835 (Orme, J., concurring).

See Weaver, 817

As Judge Orme pointed out:

Either an affidavit establishes probable cause or
it does not. No credibility issues exist; no
evidence has to be weighed. Why should not an
appellate court read the affidavit and decide for
- 2

-

itself the conclusion to be drawn, like it would
with a written contract?
Id.
Rather than protecting fourth amendment values by
encouraging police officers to draft sufficient affidavits and
magistrates to issue search warrants only where an affidavit clearly
establishes probable cause, this deference can result in searches
being upheld in borderline situations where the affidavit on its
face has failed to establish probable cause.

If the "substantial

basis" test if interpreted to uphold affidavits where probable cause
does not exist on the face of the warrant, fourth amendment
requirements will not always be met.

See Weaver, 817 P.2d at 836

(Orme, J., concurring; see also appellant's opening briefs in
State v. Rosenbaum, Case No. 910514-CA, and State v. White. Case No.
920248-CA, outlining reasons for not giving deference to
magistrate's evaluation of search warrant.
In evaluating the search warrant, this Court should assess
it to determine whether on the face of the affidavit a substantial
basis exists for finding probable cause.

Any deference given to the

magistrate should be limited to reasoned conclusions supported by
the affidavit, and not interpreted to require upholding a search
warrant where the affidavit on its face fails to establish probable
cause.!

1. Although case law indicates that deference is required,
Appellant also asks this Court to reconsider that deference standard
under the fourth amendment and, instead, make a de novo review of
the search warrant.
- 3
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2.

Did the affidavit establish proof that the object

sought would be destroyed or physical harm may result so as to
justify the issuance of a "no-knock" warrant?
Standard of Review.

Although Utah cases have stated that

the reviewing court must give deference to the magistrate's
determination of probable cause, those decisions refer specifically
to the probable cause determination and not to the determination
that a no-knock warrant is appropriate.

See Romero. 660 P.d at 719;

Weaver, 817 P.2d at 833. The deference standard has not been
articulated in assessing a "no-knock" provision in the two lead
cases from Utah appellate courts.

See Rowe, 806 P.2d at 732-3;

State v. Buck. 756 P.2d 700 (Utah 1988).
The dangers presented by no-knock warrants and the
requirement that "proof" be established before such warrants are
issued suggest that deference should not be given to the
magistrate's decision to issue a no-knock warrant.
3.

Did the issuance of a nighttime warrant, even though

the warrant was executed in the daytime, violate the statute and the
fourth amendment?
Standard of Review.

The standard of review set forth in

point 2 applies.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE AND NATURE OF THE PROCEEDINGS
The State charged Mark Blaha in an Information dated
February 5, 1991, with one count of Possession of a Controlled

- 4
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Substance, a third degree felony.

R. 210-11.2

Mr. Blaha filed a Motion to Suppress evidence seized from
his home, claiming that the magistrate issued the search warrant in
violation of the fourth amendment and Article I, § 14 of the Utah
constitution.

R. 228-9; a copy of the Motion to Suppress is

contained in addendum B.
Following an evidentiary hearing on December 4, 1991, and
the filing of memoranda, the trial judge issued a Memorandum
Decision in which he upheld the issuance of the search warrant
(R. 268-71); a copy of the Memorandum Decision is contained in
Addendum C.
On March 16, 1992, Mr. Blaha entered a conditional plea of
guilty to one count of Attempted Unlawful Possession of a Controlled
Substance, a class A misdemeanor.

R. 406.

Pursuant to State v.

Serv. 758 P.2d 935 (Utah App. 1988), Mr. Blaha explicitly reserved
his right to appeal the adverse ruling on his Motion to Suppress.
R. 406.
The trial judge placed Mr. Blaha on probation, then stayed
the thirty-day jail sentence and payment of fine pending the outcome
of this appeal.

R. 419-20.

2. Appellant Mark S. Blaha and Robert Todd White were each charged
with one count of Unlawful Possession of a Controlled Substance, in
a single Information. R. 210-11. Mr. White entered a Sery plea in
his case and is pursuing an appeal in this Court in Case No. 920248.

- 5
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STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
On January 31, 1991, Detective Bill McCarthy obtained a
"no-knock" nighttime search warrant to search the premises known as
3720 South 3375 West, West Valley City, Salt Lake County, Utah.
R. 235, 241. A copy of the Affidavit and Search Warrant is
contained in Addendum D.
The first three paragraphs of the affidavit in support of
the search warrant contain standard information about the
detective's background and experience and do not contain any
information unique to this case.

R. 237, 337.

The fourth paragraph indicates that the detective had
received information from a confidential informant ("CI") "that the
suspects at the listed address are dealing in narcotics."

R. 237.

That paragraph indicates further that "[t]he CI information is first
hand and from personal observations" and that the detective had
corroborated the information from a separate source.

R. 237.

The next paragraph indicates that the CI had never been
inside the premises nor witnessed a drug transaction.

Instead, she

had taken her husband ("the spouse") to the premises and had watched
him go inside, then exit and ingest cocaine.

The paragraph also

indicates that the spouse had told the CI that the people who
supplied him with drugs were inside the named premises.

R. 237.

The affidavit does not indicate the date on which the spouse's
statement was made or the dates that the CI took the spouse to the
premises, other than a single incident five days prior to the
issuance of the search warrant.

- 6
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According t:<> the affidavit, the spouse had threatened the
• :i i I: she provided the police with information about the premises.
The affidavit also indicates that the spouse told the CI that his
supplier had threatened him because of late payment

38.

The affidavit also indicates that a second source had
observed the spouse at the premises.

This second source also told

detective later revealed that this second source was
the parents

the spouse.

information from the second
e

affidavit also points out that the spouse has a criminal history < "
"prior arrest tc* narcotics- " R. 238.

Your affiant has been to the named premises
and has observed what your affiant believes to be
narcotics traffic. Your affiant has held
surveillance on the named premises and has
observed vehicles arrive and stay a verv «>...
period of time.

The tenth paragraph indicates that the spouse has been
using cocaine for over t
spouse

pr\ purchasing cocaine at tl:i€ i lamed premises ! or the?

past six months; and I hat the CI had observed the spouse enter and
exit the premises -

ecu

» u

The eleventh paragraph indicates that the spouse had gone
the premises as late as 2:00 __.n. and that, according to the CI,

the spouse had ingested cocaine inside the premises while purchasing
cocaine.

R. 238.
The last paragraph on R. 238 and the first two full

paragraphs on R. 239 indicate that the detective believed, based on
his background and experience, that the officers should search for
packaging material, drug paraphernalia, U.S. currency, and narcotics
records since* such items are found in narcotics dealers7 homes.
R. 238-9.
The affidavit indicates that the detective checked utility
records and found the names Brian Zeleniak and Cullen McCarty.
R. 239.

The affidavit does not mention Mr. Blaha or Robert White,

who was also charged in the Information.
Paragraph 18 requests a "night time-no knock search warrant
because
Your affiant has been told that the busiest time
of the operation is during the late evening
hours. Your affiant was told that the CI has
been to the named premises as late as 2:00 a.m.
for the purpose of purchasing cocaine."
R. 239.
Paragraph 19 also discusses the no knock service and
contains a gemeral claim by the detective that unannounced entry is
always safer than knocking, that narcotics dealers usually have
weapons, and that the evidence is easily destroyed.

That paragraph

also indicates that "the supplier at the named premises has passed
along threats to the spouse about police intervention in the illicit
operation."

R. 240.

- 8
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The next to the last paragraph states:
Your affiant considers the information
received from the confidential informants
reliable for the following reasons,
SEE BODY OF AFFIDAVIT

The officers executed the search warrant the morning after
obtaining it at about 9:30 <

A SWAT team did

followed by police officers,

R. 326-8.

The officers located only a small amount of cocaine, one
twenty-eighth of

ounce, with a s t r e e t valui-" i * I" n|>p? ox iiniicit.e I f

SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
The search warrant affidavit failed *-~ establish probable
cause to search.

The Cls had never been inside nor witnessed a drug

transaction

i

their reliability and veracity were not established.

The affidavit

did not contain dates 1 nr any oi tlie information except a single
I IS'H Hit',1, i ><'in) i' I in,' search warrant was
issued.

No controlled buys were made at the premises, and the

officer's surveillance was inconclusive
1

poorly documented.
a no-knock

warrant should be issued.

Neither the affidavit nor the search

warrant listed drugs as being sought; the items listed w^tp i
€ asi ] j destr c y edl

i

f i n thermore, even i f drugs had been listed, a

"blanket rule" authorizing a no-knock warrant whenever drugs are

sought violates the fourth amendment and Utah Code Ann.
§ 77-23-10(2).
Although this warrant was executed in the daytime, this
Court should nevertheless review the propriety of issuing a
nighttime search warrant in this case.

A substantive basis for

issuing a nighttime warrant did not exist.

ARGUMENT
POINT I: THE ISSUANCE OF THE SEARCH WARRANT
VIOLATED THE FOURTH AMENDMENT SINCE THE AFFIDAVIT
FAILED TO ESTABLISH PROBABLE CAUSE TO SEARCH THE
PREMISES.
The fourth amendment to the United States constitution
requires that "probable cause supported by oath or affirmation" be
established prior to issuance of a search warrant.

"[W]hen a search

warrant is issued on the basis of an affidavit, the affidavit in
support of the search warrant must contain specific facts to support
a determination by a neutral magistrate that probable cause
exists."

State v. Babbell. 770 P.2d 987, 990 (Utah 1990) (quoting

State v. Nielsen, 727 P.2d 188, 190 (Utah 1986), cert, denied 480
U.S. 930 (1987); see also State v. Dronebura. 781 P.2d 1303, 1304
(Utah App. 1989).
The affiant must state particularized facts and
circumstances leading to a conclusion that probable cause exists.
Mere conclusory statements will not suffice.

Babbell, 770 P.2d at

990, citing Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 239, 103 S.Ct. 2317,

- 10 -

2333,

?6 L.M.I'.rl 5 2 7 , r e h ' q d e n i e d , 4 6 3 U . S . 1 2 3 7 #

I hi ,>i| I -I'M I i I 'Ml i I

104 S.Ct. ^ ,

//

••

In Illinois v. Gates, the United States Supreme Court
adopted a "totality

* the circumstances" test :i i I assessing whether

affidavit establishes probable cause.
The task of the issuing magistrate is simply to
make a practical, commonsense decision whether,
given all the circumstances set forth in the
affidavit before him, including the 'veracity'
and 'basis of knowledge' of persons supplying
hearsay information, there is a fair probability
that contraband or evidence of a crime will be
found in a particular place. And the duty of the
reviewing court is simply to ensure that the
magistrate had a 'substantial basis for . . .
conclud[ing] that probable cause existed.
462
I

.8. at 238-9 (emoting Jones v. United States, 362 U.S. 257, 271
).
Although in Gates, the United States Supreme Court rejected

the Acruilar-Spinelli test for assessing probable cause when a
"i i»in 11 i 11 • I'm 1 l i t

i i mi 1 11 ni nil ni mi ni I

mi i ni • i 11 mi 11 mi i in<' m

11 ni i o r m a t i u 1 1 ,

11

that elements of that former test were still useful.
stated that "an informant's 'veracity '
relevant
report

'reliabil 11 , '

« t c k n o w l e d g e d

The Court
.mil "basin

of

determining the value of his

-,* !30.
The Utah Supreme Court has acknowledged tint t he Gates
rcumstances test has not completely supplanted the

Aquilar-Spinelli test.

See State v. Anderson. 701 P.2d 1099 (Utah

1985) • State v . Bailey. hi1
In Anderson,

V ,MI l"1 ft I M'l..h l'*84).

M I . -'iJ at IJ 0 J • z „ lite Court stated:

- 11 -

[I]n State v. Bailev. we observed that even under
the Gates "totality of the circumstances"
standard, compliance with the Acruilar-Spinelli
guidelines might be necessary to establish the
requisite "fair probability" that the evidence
sought actually exists and can be found where the
informant so states. However, in other cases, "a
less strong showing of the basis of the affiant's
knowledge, veracity and reliability may be
required, if the circumstances as a whole
indicate that the informant's report is truthful.
In the present case, the affidavit failed to establish
probable cause to search the premises.

The CI had never been inside

and never witnessed any drug transactions.

Although she had taken

her husband to the premises and watched him enter and exit, then
ingest cocaine, these situations were not controlled, and the spouse
could have obtained the narcotics from sources other than the
premises named in the search warrant.
In addition, much of the CI's information was hearsay—
purported statements by an alleged narcotics user to his spouse.
There were no statements in the affidavit from anyone with firsthand
knowledge who had witnessed a criminal transaction inside the
premises.
Moreover, the affidavit failed to state the dates on which
the spouse made the alleged statements that he purchased drugs at
the premises to the CI or his parents.

R. 353.

Other than the

uncorroborated incident which occurred five days before the warrant
was issued, the magistrate had no specific information regarding the
recency of the events.

The potential for information being fatally

stale in this affidavit was high.

See United States v. Leon, 468

U.S. at 904; People v. Stoppel, 637 P.2d 384, 391 (Colo. 1981) ("The

- 12 -

grounds in an affidavit for a search warrant must have a
relationship to the date and time that the warrant is issued.");
Go-Bart Importing Co. v. United States. 282 U.S. 344, 51 S.Ct. 153,
75 L.Ed. 374 (1931) (warrants are not to issue on the basis of
"loose, vague or doubtful bases of fact"); Orr v. State, 382 So.2d
860 (Fla. App. 1 Dist. 1980) (reliable CI's claim that "within the
past ten days" he had received information of another's drug
possession was insufficient because CI did not state when drugs were
actually observed); Ashley v. State. 241 N.E.2d 264 (Ind. 1968)
(even though probable cause may have once existed for searching a
building, probable cause no longer exists after an eight-day lapse
because the drugs could have since been moved); United States v.
Elliott. 576 F.Supp. 1579 (S.D. Ohio 1984) (undated reported
surveillance and anonymous complaints were insufficient
notwithstanding discovery of garbage containing illicit drugs).
The magistrate would have had to infer that the information
was recent in order to establish probable cause.

While a certain

amount of discretion is given to the magistrate to construe
ambiguity in search warrant affidavits, requiring the magistrate to
construe all ambiguities regarding timing in favor of recency would
unduly extend such discretion.
It is one thing to expect the magistrate to give
a commonsense reading to the facts set forth and
to draw inferences from them. It is quite
another thing to expect the magistrate to reach
for external facts and to build inference upon
inference in order to create a reasonable basis
for his belief that a crime is presently being
committed." (emphasis in original)

- 13 -

LaFave, Search and Seizure. 3.7(b) (quoting Commonwealth v. Simmons,
450 Pa. 624, 301 A.2d 819 (1973)).
Furthermore, although the affidavit never stated that the
activity occurred during the six-month period prior to the issuance
of the warrant, even if the affidavit had mentioned the six-month
period, such period would not have been specific enough to establish
probable cause.
Generally when the courts are forced to make an
assumption as to when transactions occurred
"within" a given period, for purposes of
determining probable cause, it must be assumed
that the transactions took place in the most
remote part of the given period . . . The reason
for this policy is obvious. If this were not the
construction given to this phrase, stale
information could be made to appear current by
the mere use of "within" language.
LaFave, Search and Seizure. 3.7(b) (quoting Commonwealth v. Novak.
233 Pa. Super. 236, 335 A.2d 773 (1975)).

In order to ensure a fair

probability that the contraband will still be at the described
premises, the magistrate must have some indicator as to timing.

See

People v. Abeyta. 795 P.2d 1324 (Colo. 1990) ("The test is whether
the timing of the events is sufficiently set forth to justify a
reasonable belief that the seizable objects are present . . . " ) .
Pierson v. State. 338 A.2d 571 (Del. 1975).

See also Merrv v.

State. 766 P.2d 1377 (Okla. Cr. 1988) ("facts which would establish
probable cause at one point in time may not be enough to establish
probable cause at some other time," "the validity of the search
warrant mandated evidence as to the date in order to show the
reliability of the informant's statement"); Morris v. State. 617

- 14 -

P.2d 252 (Okla. Cr. 1980) (affidavit found constitutionally
insufficient for failure to state when informant obtained his
information); State ex rel. Townsend v. District Ct. of Fourth J.P.,
543 P.2d 193 (Mont. 1975) (affidavit which omits reference to time
of criminal event cannot establish probable cause); People v.
Padilla. 511 P.2d 480 (Colo. 1973); Rosencranz v. United States. 356
F.2d 310 (1st Cir. 1966).
By failing to specify the times and dates in the affidavit,
the police provided the magistrate with insufficient information
with which to make a reasonable determination as to probable cause.
Although the State attempted to argue that the ongoing nature of the
enterprise prevented the information from being stale, nothing in
the affidavit attested to such an ongoing criminal enterprise.

None

of the confidential informants ever witnessed a criminal
transaction, and it is not clear when the spouse made the alleged
statements or whether he indicated on more than one occasion that he
had purchased drugs from the house.
In addition, the affidavit failed to outline the veracity
or reliability of the informants.

Although the officer believed

"that the information provided by the CI is accurate and truthful,"
he failed to investigate the CI's motive for providing information
or provide other information that would establish her veracity and
reliability.

While he claimed that her information was

corroborated, the officer provided no direct information that drug
transactions were occurring in the house and made no efforts to
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corroborate other than obtaining a rap sheet of the spouse and doing
a single night of surveillance.
The details of the detective's surveillance are
inconclusive and poorly documented.
surveillance are not noted.

The date, time or length of the

The affidavit states in conclusory

terms that the detective observed what he believed "narcotics
traffic" and that he observed "vehicles arrive and stay a very short
period of time."

The affidavit does not state how many vehicles

arrived, the arrival time, nor how long each stayed.

Nor does the

affidavit refer to people actually entering the residence—it just
mentions that vehicles came and went.

Additionally, the affidavit

does not clarify whether the vehicles were tied to the side of the
duplex for which the search warrant was issued or the other side.
Finally, the affidavit failed to list any narcotics or name
the narcotics that the officers thought they would find.
Although conclusive evidence of criminal activity is not
required, the affidavit must nevertheless make a reasonable showing
of a probability that the evidence sought will be found.

The

affidavit in this case was vague and inconclusive, based upon
hearsay and conjecture, and failed to name the narcotics which were
at the core of the investigation.

Issuing this warrant without a

substantial basis for doing so violated the fourth amendment.

POINT II. THE AFFIDAVIT DID NOT JUSTIFY THE
ISSUANCE OF A NO-KNOCK SEARCH WARRANT.

- 16 -

While the fourth amendment protects generally against
unreasonable searches and seizures, Utah Code Ann. § 77-23-10(2)
outlines the specific procedure to be followed in obtaining a
no-knock warrant.
1988).

See generally State v. Buck, 756 P.2d 700 (Utah

Utah Code Ann. § 77-23-10(2) states that a search warrant

can be executed:
(2) Without notice of his authority and
purpose, if the magistrate issuing the warrant
directs in the warrant that the officer need not
give notice. The magistrate shall so direct only
upon proof, under oath, that the object of the
search may be quickly destroyed, disposed of, or
secreted, or that physical harm may result to any
person if notice were given.
In State v. Rowe, 806 P.2d 730 (Utah App. 1991), overruled
on other grounds. Case No. 910165 (Utah September 28, 1992), this
Court discussed the propriety of no-knock warrants and held that
no-knock service is appropriate in a residential setting where
officers are seeking a small amount of drugs which can be easily
destroyed.

Id. at 732-3. As occurred in Rowe and the present case,

this approach has resulted in an almost "blanket rule" whereby
officers searching for drugs obtain a no-knock warrant based on the
ease of destruction of the drugs.

See LaFave, 2 Search and Seizure

§ 4.8(d), p. 280 (1987); People v. Gastelo, 432 P.2d 706 (Cal. 1976).
Universally allowing no-knock service whenever drugs are
sought goes against the dictates of the fourth amendment and
§ 77-23-10(2).

See State v. Sparao, 639 P.2d 782, 784-5 (Wash. App.

1982); People v. Gastelo, 432 P.2d at 707, 708; Parsley v. SUP. Ct..
513 P. 611 (Cal. 1973).

Although the United States Supreme Court
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has not directly addressed the issue of whether the fourth amendment
requires that notice be given before entry, such a notice
requirement existed at commonlaw and can be "traced back as far as
the decision in Semayne's Case. [5 Coke 91, 77 Eng. Rep. 194 (K.B.
1603)] in 1603."

2 LaFave, Search and Seizure § 4.8(a) at 270-1.

The purpose of requiring notice before entry is threefold:
(1) the protection of an individual's private
activities within his home, (2) the prevention of
violence and physical injury to both police and
occupants which may result from an unannounced
police entry, and (3) the prevention of property
damage resulting from forced entry.
State v. Buck. 756 P.2d at 701.
In the present case, the detective based his request for a
no-knock warrant on general safety concerns and a claim that the
property sought could be easily destroyed.

Basing a no-knock

warrant on a claim that the evidence sought could be easily
destroyed is problematic in this case not only because of the
"blanket rule" concern outlined above, but also because in this
case, the warrant and affidavit did not state that the officers were
seeking drugs.

Instead, the warrant sought packaging materials,

drug paraphernalia, residency papers, and records of drug
transactions.

R. 29.

Because the evidence listed in the affidavit cannot be
easily destroyed, a concern that evidence would be easily destroyed
did not prove a basis for a no-knock warrant in this case.

See

State v. Rowe, 806 P.2d at 733 n.3 ("A more particularized showing
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may well be required if, for example, a large quantity of drugs is
sought.") .
From the face of the warrant, it appears that the officers
only expected to seize evidence of an ongoing drug operation and not
drugs themselves.

This ambiguity on the face of the warrant

required further information before a neutral magistrate could issue
a warrant based on the ease of destruction of the evidence.
The officer's other basis for issuing a no-knock warrant
was a general safety concern.

First, the officer included his

personal belief that it is always safer "if the officers have the
safety of an unannounced entry*"

R* 32. This statement does not

contain any information specific to the present case.

See State v.

Rowe. 806 P.2d at 733.
In addition, affidavits based on the belief of the affiant
without showing underlying facts are not acceptable under the fourth
amendment since they do not allow for an independent determination
by a magistrate.

See Allen v. Lindbeck. 93 P.2d 920 (Utah 1939).

Furthermore, the detective's belief is contrary to the
historically recognized dangers of executing a no-knock warrant.
See 2 LaFave, Search and Seizure § 4.8(b) at 272-3.

In this case,

the trial judge questioned the detective's belief that no-knock
nighttime warrants are the safest execution in drug cases .
R. 66-74.

Despite Detective McCarthy's testimony that someone was

killed during the detective's last execution of a no-knock nighttime
warrant (R. 29), the trial judge deferred to the detective's safety
testimony in ruling.
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Next, the affidavit indicates that a no-knock warrant was
necessary because drug dealers usually carry guns.
also was not specific to the instant case.

This information

The officer included no

information that the persons inside the house were armed.

These

generalities and speculations are not a sufficient basis to risk the
dangers posed by a no-knock warrant.

See Tatman v. State. 320 A.2d

750# 751 (Del. 1974) ("an unsupported assertion of 'fear that the
defendant might have a weapon#,f insufficiently supported a good
faith belief that a "no knock" entry was necessary); State v.
Schmidtf 740 P.2d 351, 355 (Wash. App. 1987) ("general speculation
that a defendant may be armed and police safety endangered is not
sufficient to constitute exigent circumstances excusing compliance
with the knock and announce rule [and] . . . [a]n informant's
statement that the defendant kept a weapon was not sufficient");
State v. Piller. 628 P.2d 976, 979 (Ariz. App. 1981) (it was not
enough that officers knew the defendant "had negotiated for the
purchase of a .357 magnum handgun and that there was a possibility
of such a weapon being in the residence [because] [p]olice knowledge
of the existcmce of a firearm excuses compliance with announcement
requirements only where the officers reasonably believe the weapon
will be used against them if they proceed with the ordinary
announcement, and this belief must be based on specific facts and
not on broad, unsupported presumptions"); Id. ("the need for
compliance with the knock-notice requirements is stronger where the
police had knowledge of the presence of a weapon in the house and
there is nothing to suggest that the occupants have a propensity to
- 20 -

use the weapon against them, because there is more danger of a
deadly encounter if the householder is startled by an unexpected
intruder"); People v. Ouellette, 401 N.E.2d 507, 511 (111. 1979)
(prior police knowledge of a defendant's possession of a handgun and
pistol box does not justify a "no knock" search because the officer
did not demonstrate that defendant was likely to use firearms, or
that he presently unlawfully possessed them, or that he attempted to
use weapons or had threatened the police); People v. Bennetto, 517
P.2d 1163 (Cal. 1974) (citing People v. Dumas, 512 P.2d 1208 (Cal.
1973) ("where the police are aware of [the resident's possession of]
such a weapon, the case for requiring [officers] to give notice of
their authority and purpose becomes more rather than less
compelling"); State v. Pierson, 472 N.W.2d 898, 902 (Neb. 1991)
("The fact that a person is a member of a class of persons more
likely to resist search is not sufficient to justify unannounced
entry.

The officers must have knowledge of specific facts that

indicate that this particular person will conduct himself or herself
in this [violent] manner when confronted by police.").
Finally, the affidavit indicated that "the supplier at the
named premises has passed along threats to the spouse about police
intervention."
any time frame.

R. 33.

These threats were not articulated nor given

Furthermore, as the trial judge indicated while

questioning the detective (R. 371), even if persons inside the house
had made recent unspecified threats to the spouse, such threats did
not indicate that violence would occur to police officers if they
were to announce themselves prior to executing a search warrant.
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The warrant failed to state a particularized basis for
issuance of a no-knock warrant; the no-knock warrant in this case
was issued in violation of the fourth amendment and Utah Code Ann.
§ 77-23-10(2).

POINT III. THE AFFIDAVIT FAILED TO ESTABLISH
REASONABLE CAUSE TO BELIEVE THAT A NIGHTTIME
SEARCH WAS NECESSARY.
The warrant in this case authorized a nighttime search.
Nevertheless, the officers executed the search warrant during the
morning.

R. 326.
Although the trial judge ruled that the fact that the

search warrant was executed in the daytime mooted the nighttime
search warrant issue (see Memorandum Decision), this Court should
reverse that ruling and review the nighttime aspect of this warrant.
The importance of meaningful evaluation by magistrates of
affidavits seeking no-knock nighttime search warrants suggests that
where officers ultimately decide not to serve a warrant at night,
the propriety of the nighttime service provision should nevertheless
be reviewed to assure that the affidavit was independently reviewed.
Utah Code Ann. § 77-23-5(1) requires that warrants be
served in the daytime unless the magistrate inserts a nighttime
provision based on "reasonable cause to believe a search is
necessary in the night."

Utah Code Ann. § 77-23-5(1) states:

(1) The magistrate must insert a direction in
the warrant that it be served in the daytime,
unless the affidavits or oral testimony state a
reasonable cause to believe a search is necessary
in the night to seize the property prior to it
- 22 -

being concealed, destroyed, damaged or altered,
or for other good reason; in which case he may
insert a direction that it be served any time of
the day or night. An officer may request other
persons to assist him in conducting the search.
In Rowe, 806 P.2d at 733, this Court stated:
The showing required by the present statute
focuses not upon a positive showing that the
property is at the place to be searched, but upon
whether there are special circumstances which
would justify a search at night.
The Rowe court added:
[T]he statute clearly requires a particularized
showing either that 1) a search is required in
the night because the property is on the verge of
being "concealed, destroyed, damaged, or
altered," or 2) "for other good reason."
The affidavit in the present case failed to make the
required particularized showing; nothing in the affidavit attempted
to explain why a nighttime search was necessary.

The property

sought in the affidavit did not include a controlled substance, and
the items listed were not easily concealable.

Nor did the officers

have any particular reason to believe that the property would be
removed, altered or consumed.

See generally State v. Paul. 225 Neb.

432, 405 N.W.2d 608 (1987).
As this Court stated in Rowe. there is "nothing inherent in
a narcotics search which would necessitate a search at night."
Unlike Rowe. Case No. 910165, slip op. at 5, there were no
substantive grounds for a nighttime search warrant in this case, and
the officers did not have a separate arrest warrant for any of the
occupants.

In this case, there was no basis for issuance of a

nighttime warrant, and the issuance of a nighttime warrant violated
- 23 -

the fourth amendment.3

CONCLUSION
Appellant respectfully requests that this Court reverse the
trial judge's order denying his motion to suppress, and reverse his
conviction and remand this case for a new trial.

SUBMITTED this

'

day of October, 1992.

^iUuC.uXt/
JOAN C. WATT
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant

ELIZABETH A. BOWMAN
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant

3. The detective testified that he requested the nighttime warrant
because the CI had told him and he had observed that the busiest
time of operation was at night. R. 329. This testimony is puzzling
in light of the detective's further testimony that the residents
were in a band that performed at night. R. 331. The more prudent
time to search would be in the morning, when band members were at
home; this is underscored by the fact that the officers actually
served the warrant in the morning.
- 24 -

CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY
I, JOAN C. WATT, hereby certify that I have caused eight
copies of the foregoing to be delivered to the Utah Court of
Appeals, 400 Midtown Plaza, 230 South 500 East, Salt Lake City, Utah
84102, and four copies to the Attorney General's Office, 236 State
Capitol, Salt Lake City, Utah 84114, this

'

day of October, 1992.

JOAN C. WATT

DELIVERED/MAILED this

day of October, 1992.
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ADDENDUM A

77-1EM0. Force used in executing warrant — Notice of authority prerequisite, when.
(2) Without notice of his authority and purpose, if the magistrate issuing the warrant directs in the warrant that the officer need not give
notice. The magistrate shall so direct only upon proof, under oath, that
the object of the search may be quickly destroyed, disposed of, or secreted,
or that physical harm may result to any person if notice were given.

77-23-5. Time for service — Officer may request assistance.
(1) The magistrate must insert a direction in the warrant that it be served
in the daytime, unless the affidavits or oral testimony state a reasonable
cause to believe a search is necessary in the night to seize the property prior to
it being concealed, destroyed, damaged or altered, or for other good reason; in
which case he may insert a direction that it be served any time of the day or
night. An officer may request other persons to assist him in conducting the
search.

78-2a-3. Court of Appeals jurisdiction.
(2) The Court of Appeals has appellate jurisdiction, including jurisdiction of
interlocutory appeals, oven
(f) appealsfroma court of record in criminal cases, except those involving a conviction of a first degree or capital felony;

CONSTITUTION OF UTAH
ARTICLE I
Sec. 14. [Unreasonable searches forbidden — Issuance of
warrant.]
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and
effects against unreasonable searches and seizures shall not be violated; and
no warrant shall issue but upon probable cause supported by oath or affirmation, particularly describing the place to be searched, and the person or thing
to be seized.

CONSTITUTION OF THE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
AMENDMENT IV
[Unreasonable searches and seizures.]
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and
effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and
no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons
or things to be seized.

ADDENDUM B

DiST ° ! C r GOUR

ELIZABETH A. BOWMAN, #4276
JAMES C. BRADSHAW, #3768
Attorneys for Defendants
SALT LAKE LEGAL DEFENDER ASSOC.
424 East 500 South, Suite 300
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: 532-5444
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IN THE THIRD DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY,
STATE OF UTAH, SALT LAKE DEPARTMENT
MOTION TO SUPPRESS
EVIDENCE ILLEGALLY SEIZED
AND NOTICE OF HEARING

THE STATE OF UTAH,

Plaintiff,
vs.
MARK S. BLAHA,
ROBERT TODD WHITE,

Case Nc

^911900752FS

9ilFcru737Fr
JUDGE TIMOTHY R. HANSON

Defendants,

COMES NOW the defendants, MARK S. BLAHA and ROBERT TODD
WHITE, through their attorneys of record, ELIZABETH A. BOWMAN and
JAMES C. BRADSHAW, to move this Court to suppress the fruits of the
search warrant as being unconstitutionally obtained under the fourth
amendment to the Federal Constitution and Art, I § 14 of the Utah
Constitution because the search warrant w a s erroneously issued
without probable cause.

The evidence should similarly be suppressed

because the warrant was a night time, no-knock warrant lacking
sufficient justification for such provisions.
Defendant asserts the following in support of his motion:
1)

The affidavit relied upon (copy attached) in seeking

the search warrant fails to establish any indicia of reliability of
the confidential informant.

iili228

2)

The affidavit relied upon indicates the confidential

informant incriminates his or her spouse without any indication of
the status of the marriage or why such finger pointing should be
reliable.
3)

The affidavit fails to state when the spousal informant

made the alleged observations and what deals were made for the
informant not to be charged with arranging since he or she
purportedly drove the spouse to obtain drugs.
4)

The affidavit fails to state when any surveillance was

made of the premises or for how long or for how many times or if Mr.
Blaha or Mr. White were ever at the residence during such
surveillance.
5)

The affidavit fails to state with any particularity why

the "second source" is reliable.
6)

The affidavit fails to state what threats have

allegedly been made to the informant by the "spouse," or when any
such threats were made, or if they can be cooborated.
7)

The information in the affidavit is stale and there is

nothing to indicate controlled substances would be present on
January 31, 1991.
8)

The affidavit contains false statements and material

ommissions of fact.
9)

There are no facts provided to justify the inclusion of

the no knock, nightime provisions.

uU229

Mr. Blaha and Mr. White move to suppress any evidence
illegally seized in reliance on the search warrant which they assert
should not have been issued because the affidavit failed to provide
a sufficient basis for a determination of probable cause.
DATED this ^/

/

.•^IrfZAlEttTH A. /£6WMAN
Attorney for Defendant

day of 5}2*e, 1991.

C. BRADSHAW
ey for Defendant

u0230

NOTICE OF HEARING
TO THE CLERK OF THE COURT AND THE SALT LAKE COUNTY ATTORNEY:
You and each of you please take notice that the
above-entitled matter j^ll come on regularly for hearing on
the

Z£j

day of

w9

1991, at the hour of

2 ^

m.,

before the Honorable Timothy R. Hanson, Third District Court Judge,
Please govern yourselves accordingly.
DATED this

D

day of Jjife, 1991.

•^ ELIZABETH /A. BCKjMAN
/Attorney for Defendant

JAME£ 'a^BRAD!
Attorney for

ndant

MAILED/DELIVERED a copy of the foregoing to the Office of
the County Attorney, 231 East 400 South, Salt Lake City, Utah
84111, this

day of

e, 1991.

DELIVERED BY
ScP oo 1391 _

^

SC-VVJUSU/O

PATAOAMSON

ui)23i

ADDENDUM C

JF&S3'3STE55'"
J3T
Third Judicial District

JAN 2 3 1992

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

MEMORANDUM DECISION

THE STATE OF UTAH,

CASE NO.

Plaintiff,

911900752
911900753

vs.
MARK S. BLAHA,
ROBERT TODD WHITE,
Defendants.

Before
above-named,

the

Court

through

is

their

the

Motion

counsel

of

of

the

record,

defendants
to

suppress

evidence seized as a result of a search warrant authorizing
search of the premises known as 3720 South 3375 West in Salt
Lake County, State of Utah.

The warrant was issued on January

31, 1991 after presentation to Circuit Court Judge William A.
Thome, acting as magistrate of the Third Circuit Court.
The matter was before the Court on December 4, 1991, where
evidence was presented and oral argument had.

Following oral

argument, the Court indicated that it would take the matter
under advisement and allow counsel time to brief a legal issue
that had arisen based upon the evidence received during the
hearing on the question of whether or not the daytime execution

p, C\ -» ^
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STATE V. BLAHA AND WHITE

PAGE TWO

MEMORANDUM DECISION

of this warrant moots any potential defects that may have been
part

of the

execution.

issuance

of the warrant

relating

to

nighttime

The parties have filed their respective pleadings,

the Court has considered the same, and being fully advised,
enters the* following Memorandum Decision.
The

Court

is

satisfied

that

the

allegations

in

the

Affidavit, taken as a whole, are sufficient to authorize the
issuance of a search warrant.
that

the

provision

evidence

supports

in

search

the

execution is satisfactory.
knock" warrant

The Court is further satisfied
a

finding

warrant

that

the

authorizing

additional
"no

knock"

The evidence suggests that the "no

in this case was appropriate because of the

potential of the destruction of evidence, particularly where
small amounts may be involved, and for the safety of not only
officers executing the warrant, but the persons who may be on
the premises when the warrant is executed.
While the Court expressed concerns in its questioning of
the State's witnesses in this matter regarding the concept of
safety,

the

procedures,
execution

Court

does

nor does the
of

"no

knock"

not

claim

Court

any

claim

warrants

and

expertise
any
the

in

police

expertise

in the

hazards

related

thereto, and the evidence the Court has before it is from a
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MEMORANDUM DECISION

police professional who has expressed his opinions, stated the
reasons therefore, and the Court is not at liberty to ignore
that evidence, absent some legitimate reason to do so, and no
legitimate legal reason appears to exist.
Based upon the foregoing, the Court finds that there is
sufficient basis for the issuance of the "no knock" special
provisions of this warrant.
Turning
sufficient

to

the

question

of

whether

or

basis to authorize the execution

not

there

is

of the warrant

during the nighttime, the Court is satisfied that any potential
defects in the contents of the supporting documentation and the
warrant authorizing its execution at nighttime has been mooted,
inasmuch as the warrant was not executed in the nighttime, but
rather during the daytime.
Based

upon

the

foregoing,

the Court concludes

that the

defendants7 Motions to Suppress must and should be denied.
Counsel for the State is to prepare an Order indicating the
Court's

denial

of

the

defendants' Motion

to

Suppress,

and

present the same to the Court for review and signature pursuant
to the Code of Judicial Administration.
This matter is further scheduled on the Court's calendar to
determine

what

additional

dates,

trial

or

otherwise,

are

UU270

STATE V. BLAHA AND WHITE

PAGE FOUR

MEMORANDUM DECISION

necessary to bring this matter to a conclusion.

Counsel and

the defendants are to be present at they/date indicated in the
attached notice.
Dated this ^3K

day of January,/1992.

DISTRICT COURT JUDGE

azz^
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MEMORANDUM DECISION

MAILING CERTIFICATE
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy
of the foregoing Memorandum
this ^

Decision,

to the following,

T day of January, 1992:

Kenneth R. Updegrove
Deputy County Attorney
Attorney for Plaintiff
2001 S. State, Suite S3700
Salt Lake City, Utah 84190-1200
Roger K. Scowcroft
Elizabeth A. Bowman
Attorneys for Defendants
424 East 500 South, Suite 300
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
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ADDENDUM D

IN THE THIRD CIRCUIT COURT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
SEARCH WARRANT
NO
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE, STATE OF UTAH
To any peace officer in the state of Utah.
Proof by affidavit under oath having been made this day before me by Det.
Bill McCarthy, I am satisfied that there is probable cause to believe
That

( ) on the persons of
( ) in the vehicles described as
(X) on the premises known as a 3720 SOUTH 3375 WEST, the duplex on
the west side of the road, 3720 is the southern most half of the duplex, the
apartment to the north has the numbers 3718 on the front of the premises, to
include all containers, rooms, attics, and basements found therein.
In the City of WEST VALLEY, County of Salt Lake, State of Utah, there
is now being possessed or concealed certain property or evidence described
as:
SEE ATTACHMENT "A"
which property or evidence:
(x) was unlawfully acquired or is unlawfully possessed or
(x) has been used to commit or conceal a public offense or
(x) is being possessed with the purpose to use it as a means of
committing or concealing a public offense or
(x) consist of an item or constitutes evidence of illegal conduct,
possessed by a party to the illegal conduct.
fou are therefore commanded:
( ) in the day time
(x) at any time of the day (good cause having been shown)
(x) to execute without notice of authority or purpose,
(proof under oath being shown that the object of this
search may be quickly destroyed or disposed of or
that harm may result to any person if notice were given.)

i»0232

ITEMS TO BE SEIZED
SEARCH WARRANT/AFFIDAVIT
CONTINUED
ATTACHMENT "A"
1. PACKAGING MATERIAL, TO INCLUDE BUT NOT LIMITED TO, SCALES,
PLASTIC BAGGIES, TAPE, PAPER BINDLES CUT INTO SQUARES.
2. DRUG PARAPHERNALIA, TO INCLUDE BUT NOT LIMITED TO, SYRINGES,
BENT SPOONS, COTTON BALLS, MIRRORS, RAZOR BLADES, SHORT STRAWS,
PIPES FOR SMOKING COCAINE, GLASSWARE USED TO MAKE CRACK COCAINE,
CUT MATERIAL, MARIJUANA PIPES, ROLLING PAPERS AND BONGS.
3. RESIDENCY PAPERS, TO INCLUDE BUT NOT LIMITED TO, UTILITY
RECEIPTS AND OR BILLS, RENTAL/LEASE AGREEMENTS, AND ARTICLES
SHOWING OCCUPANCY OF THE PREMISES.
4. U.S. CURRENCY BELIEVED TO BE IN CLOSE PROXIMITY TO THE NARCOTICS
BEING SEARCHED FOR.
5. NARCOTIC RECORDATIONS, TO INCLUDE BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PRICE
LIST, AMOUNTS SOLD, TIMES, DATES, AMOUNTS PURCHASED, AND
ESPECIALLY DRUG INDEBTNESS.

"(1233

PAGE TWO
SEARCH WARRANT
to make a search of the above-named or described person(s), vehicle(s), and
premises for the herein-above described property or evidence and if you find
the same or any part thereof to bring it forthwith before me at the Third
Circuit Court, County of Salt Lake, State of Utah, or retain such property in
your custody, subject to the order of this court.
GIVEN UNDER MY HAND and dated this

T /

day of

.Js*^

,1391.

JUDGE, JUSTICE OF THE PEACE OR
MAGISTRATE OF THE 3RD CIRCUIT CC
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IN THE THIRD CIRCUIT COURT
IN AND FOR THE SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
STATE OF UTAH

)

County of Salt Lake

)

: ss
AFFIDAVIT FOR SEARCH WARRANT
BEFORE:
JUDGE

ADDRESS

The undersigned affiant being first duly sworn, deposes and says:
That he has reason to believe
That

( ) on the person of
( ) in the vehicle described as
(X) on the premises known as 3720 SOUTH 3375 WEST, the
duplex on the west side of the road, 3720 is the southern most half
of the duplex, the apartment to the north has the numbers 3718 on
the front of the premises, to include all containers, rooms, attics
and basements found therein.
In the City of West Valley, County of Salt Lake, State of
Utah, there is now certain property of evidence described as:
SEE ATTACHMENT "A"
and that said property or evidence:
(X) was unlawfully acquired or is unlawfully possessed; or
(X) has been used to commit or conceal a public offense; or
(X) is being possessed with he purpose to use it as a means
of committing or concealing a public offense; or
(X) consists of an item or constitutes evidence of illegal
conduct, possessed by a party to the illegal conduct;
( ) consists of an item or constitutes evidence of illegal
conduct, possessed by a person or entity not a party to
the illegal conduct. (Note requirements of Utah Code
Annotated, 77-23-3(2)

Affiant believes the property and evidence described above is
evidence of the crime(s) of possession of a controlled substance,
possession of a controlled substance with intent to distribute.
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ITEMS TO BE SEIZED
SEARCH WARRANT/AFFIDAVIT
CONTINUED
ATTACHMENT "A"
1. PACKAGING MATERIAL, TO INCLUDE BUT NOT LIMITED TO, SCALES,
PLASTIC BAGGIES, TAPE, PAPER BINDLES CUT INTO SQUARES.
2. DRUG PARAPHERNALIA, TO INCLUDE BUT NOT LIMITED TO, SYRINGES,
BENT SPOONS, COTTON BALLS, MIRRORS, RAZOR BLADES, SHORT STRAWS,
PIPES FOR SMOKING COCAINE, GLASSWARE USED TO MAKE CRACK COCAINE,
CUT MATERIAL, MARIJUANA PIPES, ROLLING PAPERS AND BONGS.
3. RESIDENCY PAPERS, TO INCLUDE BUT NOT LIMITED TO, UTILITY
RECEIPTS AND OR BILLS, RENTAL/LEASE AGREEMENTS, AND ARTICLES
SHOWING OCCUPANCY OF THE PREMISES.
4. U.S. CURRENCY BELIEVED TO BE IN CLOSE PROXIMITY TO THE NARCOTICS
BEING SEARCHED FOR.
5. NARCOTIC RECORDATIONS, TO INCLUDE BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PRICE
LIST, AMOUNTS SOLD, TIMES, DATES, AMOUNTS PURCHASED, AND
ESPECIALLY DRUG INDEBTNESS.
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PAGE TWO
AFFIDAVIT FOR SEARCH WARRANT
The facts to establish the grounds for issuance of a Search
Warrant are:
Your affiant, Detective Bill McCarthy, 8022, is employed by
the West Valley City Police Department• Your affiant was assigned
to the Metro Narcotics Strike Force for a period of over three
years. Your affiant is presently assigned to the West Valley City
Police Departmentf Detective Division, and is assigned to
investigate narcotic related offenses occurring within West Valley
City.
Your affiant has had training in narcotics identification and
in the investigation of narcotics related offenses. Affiant has
personally purchased various narcotics on numerous occasions in
relation to police investigations. Affiant was assigned to the
Metro Narcotics Strike Force for over 3 years. Your affiant is a
certified peace officer in the State of Utah for over 10 years.
Your affiant's specialized training includes the DEA basic and
advanced investigators seminars, as well as the California
Narcotics Officers Association seminars in drug recognition,
identification and investigative techniques and Alcohol Tobacco and
Firearms Undercover Investigative Techniques.
Further your affiant would like to inform the courts that your
affiant has been the affiant or has assisted in the preparation and
service of several hundred narcotic search warrants. Also several
of those search warrants were surveillance search warrants.
Your affiant had received information from a confidential
informant that the suspects at the listed address are dealing in
narcotics. Your affiant believes that the information provided by
the

CI

is

a/

^f , l ]r-rtt' Q

^nfl t r u t h f u l

for* f h a

f n l l n w v i t t j 1 ntiMifti^.

The

CI

< information^?-^^rst hand^and from personal observations) Further
vr/the CI has nolft*p?femised nor pax3 anything for the Information
/ provided. Lastly your affiant has corroborated the information
provided by the CI from a separate source.
Your affiant was told by the CI that the persons residing at
the premises listed are trafficking in narcotics. The CI basis this
belief on the following. The CI reports that over the last 6 months
the CI's spouse has been purchasing cocaine from the listed
premises. Further the CI has been to the named premises on at least
two occasions when the CI's spouse didin^farf purchase cocaine.
The most recent purchase being within^tHe^last 5 daysI>Your affiant
was further told by the CI that the Ci nas never been inside the
named premises and actually observed a transaction, however the CI
has observed the CI's spousS' enter tnen 6Xlt the named premises. ,
JtftSr the CI's has edited tfie named premises the CI has observed
the_spjQnse ingest cocaine. Further the spouse has indicated to the I
CI that the persons inside the named prpmigpg—ajM—the—spouses
supplier of cocaine.
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PAGE THREE
AFFIDAVIT FOR SEARCH WARRANT
CI told your affiant that the CI has been threatened by the
spouse if the CI came forward to the police with the information)
provided. Further the CI was told by the spouse that the supplier/
of—the cocrHnp h^s ^hr^af^p^^ the spo"^-^hgn^jthe spouse has oeen|
late in repaying^ for cocaine that was receivecT~by "Clre- spouse,
Your affiant has interviewed a second source of informa£i<rff
who has observed the spouse at the named premises. Your affiant was
also told by the second source"'that the spouse has a long history
of substance abuse, cocaine. Your affiant cannot disclose the
identity of the CI nor the second source for fear it would
jeopardize each real identity to the supplier. Further your affiant
was told by the CI that the CI has been threatened by the spouse
that the supplier would "get even" if the CI went to the police.
Your affiajife—Relieves that the information from the second
source Is accu^t^ahd truthful for the following reasons. The
souifces information's \first hand and further the second source is
a relative of the spouse. Further your affiant has reviewed the
criminal history of the spouse and the spouse does show prior
arreS-fe^for narcotics^
Your affiant has been
what your affiant believes
has held surveillance on
vehicles arrive and stay a

to the named premises and has observed
to be narcotics traffic. Your affiant
the named premises and has observed
very short period of time.

Your affiant believes that the operation is ongoing for the
following reasons. The CI states to your affiant that the spouse
has been using cocaine for over 2 years. CI states that the spouse
has been purchasing cocaine from the named premises for at least
the last 6 months. The CI has observed the spouse ingest the
cocaine intravenously for over the last year. Further the CI has
been to the named premises and has observed the spouse enter then
exit the named premise with cocaine, the most recent being within
the last 5 days.
Your affiant was told by a second family member that the
spouse does have a cocaine abuse problem and further that the
spouse has been observed at the named premisesf then later admitted
to have purchased cocaine at the named premises.
Lastly your affiant was told by the CI that the CI has been to
the named premises as late as 2:00 am with the spouse to purchase
pacaine. CI also toicr^yduif atfiaftt that the spouse has ingsF**^
duuaiiie—iiitfldtf llie—lwiuecT ^pr amices- Whxie purcnasing additional
J ^ ^ ^ ^
O"—I^rifAr^l n^_
•
Your affiant believes that the named premises should be
searched for packaging material as well as drug paraphernalia. Your
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PAGE FOUR
AFFIDAVIT FOR SEARCH WARRANT
affiant knows from training and experience that suspect's selling
narcotics often keep instruments used in the ingestion of narcotics
on hand to allow customers to test the narcotics to be purchased.
Further your affiant knows that the packaging material is an
inherent part of any narcotics sales operation. The packaging
material is needed to weight out and package additional quantities
of, narcotics for resale.
Your affiant believes that the named premise should be
searched for OS currency. Your affiant believes that the currency
will be in close proximity to the narcotics being searched for and
further that currency is evidence of the illicit operation. Money
is needed to make change during subsequent sales and used to
replenish depleted narcotic supplies, CI also told your affiant
that the spouse has spent as much as $1,000.00 in a single day at
the named premises purchasing cocaine.
Your affiant believes that the named premises should be
searched for narcotics records. Your affiant knows from training
and experience that narcotics dealers frequently keep such list
identifying amounts sold, persons sold to, amounts owed and
especially drug indebtness. Your affiant was told that the CI's
spouse has been threatened over drug indebtness to the suppliers.
Your affiant believes that the named premises should be
searched for occupancy papers. Your affiant has checked the utility
records of the listed premises and they show in the name of
ZELENIAK, BRIAN and McCARTY, CDLLEN. Your affiant has also observed
other vehicles at the named premises and would like to identify all
the occupants for possible future prosecution.
Your affiant ask the courts not to require your affiant to
publish the name of the CI for the following reasons. The CI is a
citizen informant and your affiant fears for CI's personal safety.
Further your affiant believes if the CI's name is published,
threats that have been made against the CI will be carried out..
Your affiant prays for a night time-no knock service search
warrant. Your affiant has been told that the busiest time of\ I \\jjjv—j
operation is during the late evening hours. Your affiant was toldv^
that the CI has been to the named premises as late as 2:00 am for
the purpose of purchasing cocaine.
-.
^
Your affiant prays for no-knock service for the following
reasons. Your affiant firmly believes it always safer for all
participants, police officers, participants and non-participants to
the sales operation if the officers have the safety of an
unannounced entry• Your affiant has been on numerous narcotics
search warrants were weapons have been readily available to the
occupants. Further your affiant knows from training and experience
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PAGE FIVE
AFFIDAVIT FOR SEARCH WARRANT
that more and more narcotics dealers are arming themselves to
protect the sales operations from other dealers/users. Further the
supplier at the named premises has passed along threats to the
spouse about police intervention in the illicit operation. Lastly
the property being sought pursuant to this warrant/affidavit is
very easily destroyed.
Your affiant has had this warrant reviewed by a Deputy Salt
Lake County Attorney and it has been approved for presentation to
the courts.
Your affiant considers the information received from the
confidential informants reliable for the following reasons,
SEE BODY OF AFFIDAVIT
Your affiant has verified the above information from the
confidential informants to be correct and accurate through the
following independent investigation:
SEE BODY OF AFFIDAVIT
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PAGE SIX
AFFIDAVIT FOR SEARCH WARRANT
WHEREFORE, the affiant prays that a Search Warrant be issued for
the seizure of said items:
( ) in the day time/ until 7:00pm•
(X) at any time day or night because there is reason
to believe it is necessary to seize the property
prior to it being concealed, destroyed, damaged/,
or altered, or for other good reasons to wit:
SEE ADDITIONAL INFORMATION IN BODY OF AFFIDAVIT
It is further requested that (if appropriate) the officer
executing the requested warrant not be required to give notice of
the officer's authority or purpose because:
(X)
(X)

physical harm may result to any person if notice
were given; or
the property sought may be quickly destroyed,
disposed of, or secreted.

This danger is believed to exist because:
SEE ADDITIONAL INFORMATION IN BODY OF AFFIDAVIT

FIANT DET. BILL MCCARTHY

SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN TO BEFORE ME this

^3/

day of

f

>Us»—T1991,

JUDGE
S
IN THE THIRD CIRCUIT COUJWF,
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE CC
STATE OF UTAH
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